Questions and Answers
What is the virtue of piety?
The word piety can be used in many different senses: a) as a synonym of devotion, religiosity, dedication to the things of the worship of God; and so we speak of pious or devout people; b) as equivalent to compassion or mercy; and so we say: “Lord, have mercy on us”; c) to designate a special virtue derived from justice, the virtue of piety; and d) referring to one of the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit, the gift of piety.
As a special virtue, derived from justice, it can be defined as a supernatural habit that inclines us to pay our parents, our country and all those who are related to them the honor and service due (II-II, q. 101, art. 3).
St. Thomas succinctly explains it (II-II, q. 101, art.1): “Man becomes a debtor to other men in various ways, according to their various excellence and the various benefits received from them. On both counts God holds first place, for He is supremely excellent, and is for us the first principle of being and government. On the second place, the principles of our being and government are our parents and our country, that have given us birth and nourishment. Consequently man is debtor chiefly to his parents and his country, after God. Wherefore just as it belongs to religion to give worship to God, so does it belong to piety, in the second place, to give worship to one’s parents and one’s country. The worship due to our parents includes the worship given to all our kindred, since our kinsfolk are those who descend from the same parents, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 12). The worship given to our country includes homage to all our fellow-citizens and to all the friends of our country. Therefore piety extends chiefly to these.”
By extension, those who form the same spiritual family in a religious order, call themselves brothers and sisters and whose founder is called the religious father. They too deserve the same honor and service.
Piety differs from virtues connected to it. The first of these is charity, which unites the entire human race with God, whereas piety unites only those belonging to the same trunk or common family line. Next comes legal justice, that is to say the obedience which subjects owe to the law. This justice refers to the fatherland seen as the common good pursued by all citizens. On the other hand, piety refers to the fatherland as the origin of one’s own existence. And because the fatherland always preserves this second aspect in relation to us, it must be concluded that man, even if he has acquired citizenship in another country, is always obliged to preserve piety towards his original country, while he is no longer obliged to the duties proceeding from legal justice, since he has ceased to be a subject of the government of his country.
Since piety is a special virtue, it must be concluded that the sins committed against it are also special sins, which must be expressly declared in confession. Thus, hitting or mistreating the father or mother is a special sin against piety that is different and much more serious than hitting a strange man. Something similar must be said of the sins that are committed against the homeland as such and against relatives or blood relatives.
Two sins oppose piety towards our own family, one by excess and the other by defect. Exaggerated love for relatives is opposed by excess to piety (II-II, q. 101, art. 4), which would lead to leaving unfulfilled duties higher than those owed to them (e.g., whoever renounces to follow his religious or priestly vocation for the sole reason of not upsetting his family). By defect, it is impiety, the neglect of the duties of honor, reverence, economic or spiritual help, etc., when one is able to fulfill them.
Exaggerated nationalism, despising in words or deeds all other nations, is opposed by excess to piety for our own country. By defect, it is the so-called cosmopolitanism of men without a country, whose watchword is the old pagan adage, Ubi bene, ibi patria, “Where I am well, comfortable, there is my country.”
What is exactly the obligation imposed by the second precept of the Church?
Popular catechisms usually enunciate this precept as “to confess at least once a year or earlier if there is danger of death or if one has to receive Communion.” The 1917 Code of Canon Law is more detailed in its prescriptions. “All members of the faithful of either sex after attaining the years of discretion, that is, the use of reason, are bound faithfully to confess all their sins at least once a year” (Canon 906).
This precept binds only those who have mortal sins on their conscience, since there is no obligation to confess venial sins.
It obliges all those who have reached the use of reason—that is, it binds children as soon as they are capable of committing mortal sin, even if they have not reached the age of seven, and they are not excused because they have not made their first Communion. If they have made their first Communion, children are bound by both this precept and that of annual Communion, even if they have not attained the age of seven years.
Anyone who makes a sacrilegious or voluntarily invalid confession does not comply with it the precept of confessing his sins.
Canon law does not specify when the space of one year begins. It is generally understood to mean the common designation of a year from January to December. Some authors hold that it means from Easter to Easter; others within a year after the commission of a mortal sin. Practically, the people who go to confession and Holy Communion during the time set for the Easter duty fulfill both obligations of annual confession and Easter Communion.
In danger of death, it is obligatory if there is consciousness of mortal sin, on two counts. First, because of the obligation that every Christian has to do everything he can to save his soul. Now, he who, being able to confess, does not want to do so, cannot obtain forgiveness of his sins, even if he does an act of contrition, which in this case is purely illusory, since contrition only has value in relation to the Sacrament of Penance that the sinner proposes to receive. Secondly, confession is mandatory on account of the precept of receiving the viaticum, which is seriously binding and which cannot be received without prior confession of mortal sins. If the person can make it to confession, a simple act of contrition is not sufficient.
The confession before Communion is not mandatory if one is not aware of mortal sin. But if there is consciousness of serious sin, by express prohibition of the Church (Canon 856), the simple act of contrition is not enough, however intense it may be, unless two circumstances are combined—urgent need and lack of confessor. This case could occur, for example, when a person, already at the communion rail and unable to leave without attracting the attention of others, suddenly remembers that he has a mortal sin, or if a priest, having to celebrate Holy Mass so that the faithful may fulfill the precept, does not have another priest to hear his confession. In these cases, an act of perfect contrition could be made before communion or celebration, but always with the obligation to confess later.
Are there any circumstances in which the Sacraments of the Church could be administered to non-Catholics?
Canon 731 §2 clearly states that “It is forbidden that the Sacraments of the Church be ministered to heretics and schismatics, even if they ask for them and are in good faith, unless beforehand, rejecting their errors, they are reconciled with the Church.”
All canonists and moralists agree that those who are heretics or schismatics and know that they are wrong, cannot be given the Sacraments of the Church unless they renounce their errors and are reconciled with the Church. Numerous decrees of the Holy Office put this point beyond controversy.
Controversy turns about those (baptized) Christians who are separated from the Church in good faith. It is evident that the Church cannot, as a rule, allow the administration of the Sacraments to non-Catholics. This would deny her very principles. The Sacraments are offered to those who are willing to live as the Church teaches.
Regarding those non-Catholics who are in good health the prohibition to give the Sacraments is absolute. But if they are in danger of death it seems there may be an exception.
The Holy Office, July 20, 1898, permitted the administration of the Sacraments to heretics and schismatics provided that they were in good faith and had given at least a probable sign of that good faith, and provided that all scandal were avoided.
If they are unconscious, the Holy Office declared, May 26, 1916, that conditional absolution and Extreme Unction may be given if one can judge from the circumstances that the schismatic has at least implicitly rejected his errors; scandal to Catholics present should be prevented by the declaration of the priest that the Church supposes that the person in his last moments of consciousness desired to return to the unity of the faith.
It must be stated, however, that it is very questionable whether the administration of the Sacraments of Penance and Extreme Unction (the two Sacraments about which there is question in the case of non-Catholics in danger of death) does avail anything in many cases. The principal difficulty centers on the intention necessary for the valid reception of the Sacraments.
Regarding Protestants, as they do not believe in the Sacraments, especially of Penance and Extreme Unction, their case is not one of a mere lack of faith. They positively reject the Catholic teaching. How, even when coupled with a general sorrow for their sins, a general will and intention to do all that God requires of them is a sufficient intention to receive these Sacraments is difficult to understand since the very foundation of such an intention is lacking. It is supposed that they would wish to receive the Sacraments if they knew that they were Sacraments, and if they knew that God wanted them to receive them. As actually they do not know or do not believe, it is difficult to understand how they can have a will or intention concerning something which they do not know or believe. There does not seem to be possible even an implied intention. Hence the decrees of the Holy Office required at least a probable sign of good faith and thus, at least from the circumstances, implicit rejection of errors.
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